

Pros + Cons of Proposal

- would tie Pope's prestige to a relatively specific proposal, which might be rejected by one or both superpowers. ~~However~~ It might well put him into direct conflict, at least temporarily, with US foreign policy.

However, the proposal, while specific, is simple and, it would be ~~an~~ ⁱⁿ ~~minim~~ ^{the} from the Vatican's point of view (= the context of past New York messages). It is, simply: "Stop! No more nuclear weapons" - surely a first necessary first step to significant reductions (uncompensated, at least by non-then-compensatory increases).

Both in Europe and even in the US (and in Russia) the proposal is assured of overwhelming public support. (A Gallup poll in the fall of 1981 has found 72% in support of a Freeze, despite the absence of any authoritative endorsements).

(By contrast, reductions that any small nuclear power could with stand to deficit from actually 10% 50% require complex negotiations and with each other).

Also, the results of the Bushy
Thorn and SACO negotiations with Reagan would be
known.

- s.j. in mid-1982 -

- A later announcement might build on a
now broadly-prepared base of US
public opinion, ^{we expect to a French.} But the immediate public
viability of these issues might have faded
by the shock of progress in negotiations could
cut either way, ^{it could} including public interest,
hope and action. On the other hand,
it could ~~also~~ ^{mean} ~~also~~ ^{mean} stronger
public enthusiasm for the proposal; but such
"preparatory ~~disappointment~~" ^{disillusion} is already
present, and should be amply reinforced
by January, 1982. To wait beyond that
is to risk much greater ~~disappointment~~ ^{disillusion}
to viewers is an build-ups, even
exacerbated by the process of negotiations; ²

3. The European press report - like the Russians - has so far taken a very negative attitude to the "geo-option". (I have ~~not~~ observed, incidentally, that the Russians are likely to reject it, and ^{that} this is known, cynically, to the US proponents; but I have ^{also} tended to suggest, with less validity from the point of view of their own basic attitudes, that the Russians should not accept, or be asked to accept, the ^{unilateral} proposal: on this is other settings of call on each nation to abandon the system involved unilaterally, without awaiting balancing reductions.). Indeed, the French proposal has been ignored by E.V.O. Furthermore, the combination of the two ^{proposals}, if its appearance feasible of Russian endorsement, should be quickly recognizable as offering an end to increases in the nuclear threat to Europe, not a major indirect reduction in that threat. None of the national demands made ~~and~~ by EVO groups offers as much: although

much work would remain for END
(technical and legal, and the world,
a nuclear-free zone) even if the proposal
were accepted by the US & SU. (And if
the ~~strength~~ of the ~~END~~ ~~movement~~ would
be ~~kept~~ ~~about~~ ~~much~~ ~~accepted~~).

^(A) ~~It~~ is not proposed that any energy
should be withdrawn from national
movements for unilateral measures foreign
or domestic give weapons rights ^{to} the
the argument that ^{unilateral} ~~such~~ efforts preclude
successful bilateral negotiation, it can be
pointed out that this "unilateralist"
movement has been the prerequisite for the
very opening, the year and ^{effective} ~~and~~ not year, of
such talks of the Reagan administration.
If such negotiations are, at last, successful,
it will be largely because of the prospect
of increasingly powerful public reaction
organized by the movement if it should fail.

INSERT A It ~~will~~ ^{can} be argued of ~~some~~ ^{the} ~~same~~
^{above} ~~movement~~ that public demands for, and ~~expression~~ ^{of}
hope in, bilateral negotiation, distract from and are

logically not practically inconsistent
with pressure toward unilateral moves.

INSERT 3 above

ccc The real change in stance would be
toward a positive attitude toward real
reductions, made bilaterally, as a national
response to public demands for unilateral
reductions; also, a realistic awareness
of the crucial importance for ^{Europe} ~~reduction~~ ^{an end}
to ~~improvement~~ ^{to} ~~increase~~ ^{a state to} ~~in arms~~ ^{and}
a ~~press~~ ^{press} ~~real~~ ^{real} reductions.

- For 36 years, at least one crucial
party to negotiations, ^{- the US -} has not, in fact,
proved him willing to accept an end to
its own build-up & "modernization."

In that connection, the sincerity of any
other party - from Russia to the Vatican -
has not really been tested. If the above
argument, that there exists now for what
may be only a short time, conditions of
parity and economic and diplomatic pressures
that make acceptance of an end to the
arms race, if proposed by the Soviets, possibly
acceptable to the US, then such a test is
at hand. ¶ Do the Russians really want,
to end the arms race? ^{even} enough to ^{accept} an
approach that could be the ~~rather~~ ^{rather} end
of the arms race? Does the Pope? Or the
other European ~~authorities~~ ^{authorities} public figures?
Is a position ~~more~~ ^{more} really consistent with
a refusal to try this approach, ^{now} ^{now}?
Failure

Paper:

for / merge!

Freige

and NEU

(vs. NATO plans;
SU production plans.
FS weapons;
"DAN")

Imminent: or else!

or else: then to "give up hope" in
the temporary expenditure of occupying
possession + prod of arms as a "loss" (in
(to war) buying time for disarmament.

Both, must recognize fundamental conf -
- refuse coop. with prod + possession
with any use : troops; air soldiers; workers...

A "last chance" to support
"hope" placed in disarmament.

Born Rally 22 Nov 81

1. Are SS-20s needed for SC security?

→ [Chris Paine: Can MX do anything
P can?

If P has 100 yd CEP
(not 30), can/will it use
1 KT warhead?]

2. What are B's priorities?

How much does he want to block P/CM?
to end

3. "What do we want? End of the arms race."

What do we want it? Now!

Next: disarmament, abolition.

First, now: STOP.

4. Will/can SC accept?

Not of standards of US Presidents;
nor of the standards of "SALT process":

— which one side (perhaps both)

doesn't want arms race to stop; and
with expects it to stop.

Both have to be willing; US Pres will not be willing without his moment.

(e.g. in Europe, on Schmidt:')

(Geyelin: SU will be less willing — to limit SS-20's — give peace moment, which will block P/CM without SU concession. But

But peace moment is Ev. cannot stop US building — which SU wants — SU stop is needed for that.

(not just, giving up SS-20's)

Answer

With peace moment, a SU offer of Fringe right have to be accepted by US; without it, US will not make such an offer (Reagan wouldn't go that far even with peace moment nor accept it).

~~1111~~ REAGAN'S WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY

(It is assuming that 1) SU may want to block P/CM more than it wants SS-20; 2) SU wants Fringe more than US does; and, more than ^{continues}

Schmitt's vulnerability makes Reagan
susceptible to pressure from public
(and SU) for the first time.

The views expressed by E. P. Thompson, Rudolf Bahro and myself at a symposium sponsored by the Green Party in Bonn on Nov. 22 were the direct opposite of those attributed to us — or more specifically, attributed to all the Green spokespersons, with ours being the only ones mentioned in the report of the symposium in the paper. ~~I did not have a right one either~~

in Hanna Pick's account of November 23d.

Speaking for myself: far from "drowning"
" I welcome Mr. Riquin's proposal
and would be happy to see the Russians
accept it, or still better a broader proposal
which eliminated ~~still~~ other nuclear weapons
along with them. ~~I believe it is far from likely~~

For from " " " "

I believe that the SS-20 adds
nothing at all to the security of the
SU

JAN 28, 1982

NO NEW: MX, D-5; P, CM; N
New SC 1CBMs, 1RBMs, MRBMs (exactly: Soviet I-Type SSBMs?)

DISMANTLE: SS-18 & (17? 19?) SS-20 [on pretty narrow]
MH-III (w M-12A, NS-Lo?)

(Bottled nose - 300 km from down?)
old Europh?

FREEZE + ZERO-OP/DPN!
+ NFO + NO-FCS - WEAPONS
SS-18
M-124

NOV 81 / JAN 83